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THE PROSPECTIVE EFFECTS OF MODIFYING EXISTING LAW
TO ACCOMMODATE PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
BY BATTERED WOMEN
MARTIN E. VEINSREIDERIS t
INTRODUCTION
The acceptance of violence between private citizens in a free
society, while morally repugnant, is seemingly necessary. The
coexistence of laws punishing for murder and absolving absolutely for
self-defense points to a tension between values that society holds as
sacred. Nowhere is this tension more apparent than in the debate
over the concept of "preemptive" self-defense. This particular variant
of self-defense arises in situations where a would-be aggressor is
attacked without a clear, imminent show of force, based on the would-
be victim's perception of future danger.' This Comment explores the
role of preemptive strikes in the law of self-defense in three contexts:
battered woman syndrome cases, prisoner on prisoner violence, and
the so-called "cultural defense."2 In particular, this Comment argues
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In a strict sense, "[s]elf-defensive force is always preemptive." Larry Alexander, A
Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DA.ME L. REV. 1475, 1476 (1999).
For example, "A draws his pistol and points it threateningly at B. B draws his own
pistol and fires at A. B's act is one of paradigmatic self-defense. But A had not yet
fired at B.... Had A actually fired all of his bullets before B could draw, B's subsequent
use of force would not be self-defensive but retaliatory." Id. at 1476-77. This
Comment, however, focuses on situations where "the best defense may be to attack
first, thus blurring the line between aggressor and target." James E. Robertson, "Fight
or F..." and Constitutional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by
Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REv. 339, 339-40 (1995).
2 The "cultural defense" exists as a loosely defined set of theories regarding the
role that an immigrant's indigenous culture should play in assessing culpability. One
commentator defines the defense by stating that:
A successful cultural defense would permit the reduction (and possible
elimination) of a charge, with a concomitant reduction in punishment [based
upon the theory that] an individual's behavior is influenced to such a large
extent by his or her culture that either (i) the individual simply did not
(613)
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that the dilution of self-defense law's imminence requirement in cases
in which battered women preemptively attack their husbands will be
misappropriated by prisoners, who could claim the right to
preemptively attack other inmates. Likewise, proponents of the
cultural defense will use a relaxed imminence requirement to argue
that preemptive strikes in the name of self-defense inhere in a
particular minority culture's norms, and should thus be excused from
culpability. Ultimately, a more focused approach towards preserving
the imminence requirement is necessary to prevent preemptive self-
defense claims from succeeding in situations (such as prison) in which
society is less prepared to accept this kind of violence than it is in
those situations involving battered women.
This Comment generally examines situations in which the dilution
of the imminence requirement in self-defense law that is seen in
battered woman syndrome cases can be misappropriated by prisoners
(and commentators) who claim a right to preemptive self-defense in
anticipation of a future attack. Part I of this Comment provides an
overview of state statutory treatment of the imminence requirement in
self-defense and offers paradigmatic examples of the different
formulations. Part II examines various proposals to modify
substantive self-defense law in reaction to battered woman syndrome
cases. Part III discusses the negative effects that any change to the
substantive law as a reaction to battered woman syndrome cases would
have on preemptive self-defense in prison. Part IV explores the
possibility that acts of violent preemptive self-defense could be
excused through a combination of a relaxed imminence requirement
and the cultural defense. Finally, Part V argues that clemency,
encompassing both pardons and commutation of sentences in
battered woman syndrome cases, rather than a relaxed imminence
requirement with far-reaching negative effects, could serve as an
alternative means of pursuing the interests ofjustice.'
believe that his or her actions contravened any laws ... , or (ii) the individual
was compelled to act the way he or she did ....
Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437,439 (1993).
3 Any discussion of social issues such as battered woman syndrome, and of women
who use violence to defend themselves while not immediately threatened, inevitably
includes valuejudgments based on concepts of both individual and collective morality.
As a result, generalization becomes a necessary evil. One would assume that the vast
majority of lay citizens would agree that the North Carolina Court of Appeals was
correct in the infamous case of State v. Norman (Norman 1), 366 S.E.2d 586, 592 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989), when it overturned Judy Norman's
conviction for killing her abusive husband while he slept. Likewise, not only lay
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I. THE ROLE OF IMMINENCE IN SELF-DEFENSE LAW
The basic requirements for the use of force to defend oneself
against an unlawful attack are generally well settled, yet they are
riddled with small differences from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One
may use force to defend oneself so long as the responsive force is
necessary, in response to an imminent attack, and proportional to the
force threatened.4  These three basic doctrinal requirements have
been composed in seemingly infinite linguistic variations.
A. Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code, for example, states that "the use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes
that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force ... on the present
occasion."5 The Model Penal Code also allows the use of deadly force
if the actor "believes that such force is necessary to protect himself
against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse
compelled by force or threat."6 One justification for the Code's
citizens, but many commentators would agree that the North Carolina Supreme Court
was legally and morally wrong to overturn the Court of Appeals and reinstate
Norman's conviction in State v. Norman (Norman f), 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
Therefore, a certain amount of social (if not legal) acceptance for the actions of
battered women is assumed. As one commentator noted:
On one level the view of the majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court is
unassailable-the threat of death or great bodily harm was not imminent
when Ms. Norman shot her husband, not, at least, by any reasonable
interpretation of the word imminent. ... Thus, to the extent the court was
simply applying the settled law of North Carolina, its decision was surely
correct. ...
At a deeper level, however, the decision is disturbing....
If it is true, as the evidence at trial tended to show, that either a call to the
police or an attempt to run away would have resulted in a risk of death or
further torture, then is it proper for society to brand Ms. Norman, and others
similarly situated, as criminals?
Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C.
L. REv. 371, 375-76 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also infra note 73 and
accompanying text (discussing the comparative morality of preemptively killing an
abusive spouse and killing a prison inmate to gain status).
WAYNER. UFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (1986);
see also Alexander, supra note 1, at 1476 (providing theoretical bases for self-defense
law).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
Id. § 3.04(2) (b). The Model Penal Code's allowance of deadly force against
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat is particularly significant when
considering both preemptive strikes in the prison context and battered woman
616 UNVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:613
seemingly broader allowance of force against such crimes is "the
extreme degree to which [such crimes] deprive the victims of the
opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination."7 An
example of self-defense that might be justified under the Model Penal
Code, but not under certain state statutory schemes, is:
V takes a book to a bench in the park, fully intending to sit there and
read all afternoon; A approaches with a baseball bat, orders Vto stay on
the bench until 3:00 P.M., and threatens to hit Vwith the bat if but only
if V tries to leave before 3:00. When noise distracts A, V makes her
escape by grabbing the bat and hitting A, breaking his leg.
8
Under the Code's liberty-enhancing scheme, such a use of force is
legitimate because Vs "sovereignty" is threatened.9
B. State Statutoy Treatment
State statutes generally treat the immediacy requirement of self-
defense in one of two ways. Certain statutes use language stating that
any threatened force must be "imminent" before self-defense is
allowed."0 Other statutes use language indicating that any force used
must be "immediately necessary."" As will be evident when
considering battered woman syndrome and prisoner self-defense, the
specific formulations have inherent differences and can sometimes
have an effect on whether or not a jury instruction is given on self-
defense. 2
syndrome cases. Certain states also explicitly allow for the use of deadly force to
prevent sexual intercourse compelled by force. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a) (3)
(1975) (allowing the use of deadly force to prevent "forcible rape or forcible
sodomy"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(2)(c) (1999) (allowing deadly force when
"[the other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit... sexual
assault").
7 ROBERT F. SCHOPPJUST1FICATION DEFENSES ANDJUST CONVICTIONS 86 (1998).
Id. at 63 (footnote omitted).
SId.
10 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a) (1975) (justifying the use of physical force
when faced with the imminent, unlawful force of another); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
704(1) (1999) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(a) (1999) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-3211 (1995) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.209 (1990) (same).
1 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-404(A) (1989) (justifying the use of physical force
when it is immediately necessary to protect oneself from the unlawful force of
another); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(a) (1975) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-
304(1) (1993) (same); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(a) (West 1998) (same).
12 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the impact of a choice between "imminent" and
"immediately necessary"). Not all commentators see the distinction between the two
formulations as significant. See SCHOPP, supra note 7, at 99 ("[A]lthough some courts
and commentators have attributed significance to the selection of 'imminent' or
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Alongside the distinction between "imminent" and "immediately
necessary" is the requirement of reasonableness found in certain state
statutes.13 The presence of a reasonableness requirement indicates
that the jurisdiction has an objective standard of self-defense, while
the lack of such a requirement generally indicates a subjective
standard of self-defense. 4  Again, the presence or lack of a
reasonableness requirement is clearly relevant to the actions of
battered women and to those of prisoners who attack preemptively
out of self-defense.5 In fact, the reasonableness requirement often
serves as a gatekeeper for a self-defense instruction to ajury."
An example of a state that has adopted a broad approach to its
statute's imminence and reasonableness requirements is North
Dakota. That state's supreme court stated in the case of State v.
Leidholm, which involved a woman killing her husband while he slept
after an argument:
If, therefore, a person has an actual and reasonable belief that force
is necessary to protect himself against danger of imminent unlawful
harm, his conduct is justified or excused....
[W]e now decide that the finder of fact must view the circumstances
attending an accused's use of force from the standpoint of the accused
to determine if they are sufficient to create in the accused's mind an
honest and reasonable belief that the use of force is necessary to protect
himself from imminent harm.
17
In many cases involving battered women, as will be seen, the
immediacy requirement can often be more outcome-determinative
'immediate,' neither ordinary nor legal usage supports this attribution when the two
terms are accurately interpreted.").
)I See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.15(1) (McKinney 1997) ("A person may... use
physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes
such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably
believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other
person .... ).
14 See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 49-50 (N.Y. 1986) (discussing the difference
between subjective and objective jurisdictions and comparing New York's objective
standard to the Model Penal Code's subjective standard).
1, See infra Part III (discussing the potential misappropriation of self-defense law
by prison inmates).
If See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Curent Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 412 (1991) ("A reasonableness
standard's outcome-determinative impact on the content of a self-defense instruction
is obvious.").
17 State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,816-18 (N.D. 1983) (citations omitted).
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than a reasonablenessjudgment. 8
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
A. The Role of Battered Woman Syndrome in the Courtroom
The origin of battered woman syndrome is typically traced back to
the 1979 book The Battered Woman by Lenore Walker.'9 Walker's
theories have become quite well known and well commented upon in
both legal and sociological circles. 0 Battered woman syndrome is
usually introduced to ajury through expert testimony.2' As a practical
matter, courts increasingly have accepted expert testimony regarding
battered woman syndrome since its initial formulation, particularly in
cases involving homicides." The utility of battered woman syndrome
testimony for the defense is summarized by Robert Schopp:
Courts and commentators have argued that expert testimony regarding
battered woman syndrome provides juries with important information
regarding several aspects of self-defense.... [S]ome cases involve
circumstances in which the defendants exercise violence in the absence
of an imminent overt attack. Some contend that expert testimony
regarding the syndrome explains how these defendants could reasonably
believe that attacks were forthcoming and that defensive force was
necessary despite the absence of immediate violence. Some courts and
commentators discuss a special ability to perceive subtle clues of
18 See Maguigan, supra note 16, at 413 (explaining that reasonableness "is not the
sole determinant... [but rather] the more significant impact is from the jurisdiction's
definition of the temporal proximity of danger").
19 See David L. Faigman & AmyJ. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 67, 68 (1997) (stating that Walker's book introduced the first
working hypothesis of battered woman syndrome).
20 Walker's theories, while widely used in the courtroom, have very vocal critics.
See, e.g., id. at 75-78 (arguing that Walker's cycle theory suffers from "empirical
vacuity"); see also Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to
Support the Substance; 38 How. L.J. 297, 301 (1995) (arguing that battered woman
syndrome reinforces "debasing female stereotyp [es]").
21 Admissibility is, of course, the first threshold regarding expert testimony. See
FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting expert testimony to assist the trier of fact in
understanding evidence and facts in issue). More importantly, however, courts vary
significantly from state to state in determining the scope and purpose of expert
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome. See Maguigan, supra note 16, at 429-30
(noting that certain states allow only a general description of the syndrome by an
expert, while other states allow an expert to give an opinion as to whether the
defendant's actions against her batterer were reasonable).
See Faigman & Wright, supra note 19, at 81 (noting that "[iln general, courts
have been sympathetic toward defendants' use of the battered woman syndrome in
homicide prosecutions, and most admit expert testimony concerning this issue").
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forthcoming violence as part of the syndrome, arguing that this aspect of
the syndrome renders the perception of imminent violence reasonable
despite the lack of external indicators ....
The acceptance of battered woman syndrome testimony in the
courtroom is far from universal; as Faigman and Wright note, "this
sympathetic approach has not been entirely uncritical and some
courts remain adamantly opposed to the introduction of this evidence
on the basis of legal doctrine or inadequate science. While the
introduction of past instances of abuse and of expert testimony
regarding the reasonableness of a particular woman's response to
abuse does not guarantee an acquittal, expert testimony affords
defendants the opportunity to prove an affirmative defense.
The model introduced by Walker includes a series of cycles,
whereby a "tension building" phase is followed by an "acute battering
incident," which is in turn followed by a period of "loving
contrition."2 During the phase of "loving contrition," the batterer
"typically expresses regret and profusely apologizes, usually promising
never to batter the woman again," which contributes to the victim
staying in the abusive relationship. 26 During the cycle, the woman falls
victim to a "cumulative terror" of violence, fearing harm "even during
the peaceful interlude between episodes of abuse."27 As a result, the
victim often sees a lull in the violence as her only opportunity to
defend herself against a physically larger and stronger aggressor, and
28against the looming threat of future violence.
More significant than expert testimony regarding reasonableness
in such cases is the difference in practical application between
i- SCHOPP, supra note 7, at 93.
V4 Faigman & Wright, supra note 19, at 81 (citation omitted). This concern about
inadequate science is shared by many commentators. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The
"New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome," 14 CRIM. JuST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1995) ("All too often...
the new syndromes are not sufficiently validated and are the product of unacceptably
'soft' science or clinical crockery."); see also Hill v. State, 507 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1986) (holding that "[t]he danger of a jury's according undue weight to
unproven and perhaps unreliable scientific testimony justifies excluding such
evidence"); State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting expert
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome as legally similar to allowing a claim of
"partial responsibility," an approach that had been rejected in favor of an "'all or
nothing' (i.e., sane or insane) approach" in Louisiana).
25 Faigman & Wright, supra note 19, at 72 (quoting Lenore E. Walker, THE
BAT=ERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-104 (1984)).
"" Id.
-7 Id. at 73.
See id. (describing these features of the cycle); see also infra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text (discussing obstacles to leaving an abusive situation).
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reasonableness and imminence. As was seen in Norman II, imminence
is often a greater hurdle than is reasonableness for acquittal in
battered woman syndrome cases. Manyjudges and juries will accept a
preemptive attack on a batterer as intrinsically "reasonable," but then
have a difficult time explaining away the attack's circumstances.Y
While imminence and reasonableness are interrelated, for the
purposes of certain instances of self-defense, they can be broken down
into separate, independent components. This has led commentators
to search for alternatives to the imminence rule-alternatives which
would prove troublesome if applied to similar circumstances outside
the context of spousal abuse.
B. Formulations of Preemptive Self-Defense in
Cases Involving Battered Women
One of the most controversial areas of legal scholarship and
practice involving battered women involves cases in which a victim
attacks her batterer without immediate provocation." While it is
unclear how prevalent these cases are, they are sensational enough
that commentators and courts have seized upon them as mediums for
debate regarding the true substance of self-defense law."'
29 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in overturning the court of appeals,
recognized this tension by referring to the defendant's evidence in the case as
"poignant" but holding nonetheless that the defendant was not in imminent fear of
death when she killed her husband. State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 15
(N.C. 1989). One might presume that if the court applied a strict test of
reasonableness without considering imminence, the result of the case might have been
different.
3o See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 574-76 (Kan. 1988) (describing facts
where defendant shot her husband while he slept); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366
S.E.2d 586, 587-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (describing circumstances leading to the
killing and noting that the defendant shot her husband while he slept). As was the
case with the North Carolina Supreme Court in Norman HI, in Stewart, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that the shooting could not be self-defense due to a lack of
imminent danger. See Stewar4 763 P.2d at 579 (holding that "when a battered woman
kills her sleeping spouse when there is no imminent danger.., a self-defense
instruction may not be given").
31 The actual prevalence of cases involving nonconfrontational attacks is a point of
debate. See Maguigan, supra note 16, at 384 (arguing that "over seventy percent of all
battered women who kill do so when faced with either an ongoing attack or the
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury"). Maguigan also describes
nonconfrontational killings as a popular myth. See id. at 388-401 (arguing that
appellate opinions and empirical evidence from social scientists indicate that legal
scholars are incorrect in assuming most battered women kill during
nonconfrontational situations). But see Rosen, supra note 3, at 403-04 & n.84
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The most significant problem with cases where battered women
attack their husbands in nonimminent situations is that, despite the
fact that their actions do not fit the neat definition of self-defense, an
innate sense of justice nevertheless leads judges, juries, and legal
commentators to blur the edges of self-defense law in order to defend
the women's actions. As this Comment seeks to show, such subtle
manipulation and change of the substantive law of self-defense, while
possibly desirable to achieve just results in this narrow context,
inevitably will lead to undesirable results in other contexts." Stephen
Morse outlines the changes to substantive law desired by some
advocates by stating that "[c]ourts and, less often, legislatures are
increasingly inundated with claims that syndromes old and new...
should be the basis for... legal change.... [One] proposal is the
expansion of old defenses: for example, loosening objective standards
for justifications such as self-defense. "13 The imminence requirement
is often the starting point for those who seek to change the law in such
a manner.
1. Eliminating the Standard of Imminence
The first proposal offered regarding nonconfrontational
situations in which a battered woman kills her abuser is a
reformulation of the substantive definition of self-defense without an
imminence requirement.m The obvious problem with eliminating the
requirement is that something must stand in its stead to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of self-defense. 5  One
proposal seeks to replace the imminence requirement with a more
adaptable standard of necessity:
[T]he traditional insistence on a literally "imminent" infliction of great
(criticizing Maguigan's assertion that nonconfrontational killings are isolated
incidents).
See infra Part III (discussing preemptive self-defense in prison).
Morse, supra note 24, at 3.
-4 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. &
POLV' 105, 127 (1990) (arguing that the distinctive features of battering situations
render the imminence requirement irrelevant); see also Sarah Baseden Vandenbraak,
Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent Intramarital Assaults, 10 RUTGERS-CAM.
L.J. 643, 658 (1979) (arguing that imminence should not be a necessary component of
self-defense).
M Imminence serves as a threshold requirement for legitimate uses of self-defense:
"[I]n most circumstances the judgment that no nonviolent alternative will suffice is
more likely to be accurate regarding an imminent harm than a remote one." SCHOPP,
supra note 7, at 102.
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bodily harm must be abandoned outright. Imminence is relevant only
because it helps identify cases where flight or legal intervention will be
impossible, so that violent self-help becomes truly necessary. The
decisive factor is necessity, not imminence per se. 
6
The justification for abandoning the imminence requirement is
often put simply in terms ofjustice:
Courts' refusal to recognize a right of self-defense in a non-
confrontational situation, such as when the battered woman kills her
batterer while he sleeps, by creating a per se rule that the threatened
harm be "imminent" before a self-defense instruction may be given to a
jury, may be unjust in a battered woman's situation.
37
Such a standard could benefit defendants in cases such as Norman
II, but it proves to be problematic. First, if the traditional justification
of necessity replaces the imminence requirement, a typical battered
spouse may not be exculpated in every case. The necessity defense
provides that "there must have been no adequate altemative" to the
act& Yet a defendant in a nonconfrontational killing has the option
to escape harm by the very definition of the encounter. In other
words, if the batterer is sleeping, the adequate and reasonable
alternative to attacking him is simply to leave the situation. However,
the woman in the relationship typically has been threatened with
either great bodily harm or death if she leaves; therefore, no
reasonable alternative exists.Y9 This lack of alternatives is amplified by
social pressures, including a lack of financial resources, family
support, or child care concerns, as well as psychological pressures,
including "learned helplessness... rendering the defendant unable
to leave by preventing her from recognizing and taking advantage of
available opportunities to alter her situation."40
A stronger critique of using a necessity standard in battered
woman syndrome cases is that the traditional definition of necessity
Schuhofer, supra note 34, at 127.
7 MJ. Willoughby, Comment, Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a Battered
Woman Claim Self-Defense hen She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer?, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 169,
191 (1989).
Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 979 (Alaska 1979).
39 See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 83-93 (1991) (discussing the problem of "separation
assault" and describing the underlying threats made against women who eventually kill
their abusers); see also infra Part II.B.3 (discussing a proposal that would take a battered
woman's alternatives into account in deciding whether to grant a self-defense
instruction without an imminence requirement).
40 SHOPP, supra note 7, at 112.
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typically does not allow for homicide on the theory that the harm
caused would be greater than the harm avoided.41 As a byproduct, the
law of necessity is in conflict with the Model Penal Code, as well as
state statutes that allow for deadly force to prevent forcible sexual
intercourse, which is often a component of battered woman
syndrome. The Model Penal Code addresses this dichotomy by stating
that "[w]hile there may be situations, such as rape, where it is hardly
possible to claim that greater evil was avoided than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense, this is a matter that is safely
left to the determination and elaboration of the courts. ' 2 In essence,
proponents of replacing the imminence requirement with the
principle of necessity offer a solution that by definition is unworkable
because it will excuse homicide only infrequently.43  Given the
definitions of the Model Penal Code and state statutes, replacing
imminence with necessity is logically unsound, and would not achieve
the desired result because the harm of homicide would be greater
than the harm avoided in most cases.
An alternative to replacing the imminence requirement with the
justification of necessity is switching from imminence to the
"immediately necessary" standard, or the Model Penal Code's
formulation." The obvious problem with this proposal is that,
removed from the issue of reasonableness, there is little practical
difference between the two standards. a In addition, the elimination
of imminence and the implementation of the "immediately necessary"
standard does not mean that ajury will always ignore imminence in a
battered woman case. On the contrary, "[e]liminating the imminence
requirement in a specific case does not mandate a specific verdict....
Nor does its elimination make the question of imminence irrelevant.
Imminence remains, as do the other factors in the case, relevant to
41 Nelson, 597 P.2d at 979.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.02 cmt. 3 (1962) (citation omitted); see also supra note
6 (providing examples of states that allow for deadly force in this context).
4 See genera!yJOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 488-93
(1994) (discussing necessity as a defense to murder, as well as the Dudley & Stephens
case).
Schulhofer, supra note 34, at 127-28; see also supra notes 10-15 and
accompanying text (citing various statutory uses of the terms "imminent" and
"immediately necessary," while noting that some argue the distinction between the two
terms is not significant).
45 See Rosen, supra note 3, at 377 n.1 1 (noting that although Schulhofer advocates
the "immediately necessary" standard, he fails to explain the actual difference between
"imminent" and "immediately necessary").
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the jury's core inquiry."46 Additionally, one commentator's empirical
research suggests that a switch from "imminent" to "immediately
necessary" could actually hurt a battered woman's chances of
prevailing on a theory of self-defense. As she concludes from a state
survey, "[a] battered woman defendant in an 'imminent' jurisdiction
is more likely than her counterpart in an 'immediate' jurisdiction to
get a jury instruction specifically on the relevance of the decedent's
past violence." 4 The issue of past violence is, of course, of utmost
importance to a woman who kills her sleeping batterer; the batterer's
past actions will often shape ajury's judgment even when admitted for
the sole purpose of determining the defendant's state of mind.
The elimination of the imminence requirement, while
superficially appealing to those who believe imminence is the sole
hurdle to justice for battered women, is not a feasible alternative, and
would be undesirable in situations other than battered women's
cases. 48 As the Norman I court noted:
[C] hanging the "imminent death or great bodily harm" requirement...
would weaken our assurances that justification for the taking of human
life remains firmly rooted in real or apparent necessity. That result in
principle could not be limited to a few cases decided on evidence as
poignant as this.... [T] he relaxed requirements of self-defense found in
what is often called the "battered woman's defense" could be extended in
principle to any type of case in which a defendant testified that he or she
subjectively believed that killing was necessary and proportionate to any
perceived threat.49
46 Id. at 392.
47 Maguigan, supra note 16, at 415; see id. at 464-67 (providing surveys indicating
decedents' history of abuse, the admissibility of expert testimony and assessments of
the reasonableness standard, the temporal proximity of the danger, and the required
showings for a self-defense instruction). Maguigan also notes that "[t]he choice of
definition, by itself, is a significant indicator of the importance of the social context of
a defendant's action." Id. at 414. Maguigan appears to be taking the opposite stance
from Schulhofer, arguing that an "imminence" standard expands the temporal
circumstances that ajury can consider, while an "immediate" standard restricts those
circumstances. See id. (finding that ajury in an "imminence" standard jurisdiction will
be required to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's
action while the jury in an "immediacy" standard jurisdiction must limit its
consideration to the particular instant of the defendant's action); Schulhofer, supra
note 34, at 127 (arguing that imminence is relevant only to help identify cases in which
flight or legal intervention are impossible, and is therefore not a decisive factor in
assessing the likelihood of suffering great bodily harm).
48 See infra Part III (discussing preemptive self-defense in prison).
49 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 15-16 (emphasis added).
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2. Expanding the Definition of Imminence
A second proposal to eliminate injustice in cases in which battered
women preemptively attack their abusers is an extension of the
definition of imminence within the traditional self-defense
framework. Specifically, the proposal would make the imminence
standard a more subjective one, thereby equating repeated acts of
violence against a particular battered woman with a situation in which
the defendant is in a perpetual state of imminent danger (or at least
fearful) of serious bodily harm or death.5°  One commentator
describes a situation in which a "woman was in a state of cumulative
terror because her husband continually threatened to kill her. The
past behavior of the husband indicated that he was not bluffing, but
was perfectly capable of carrying out his threat."' This notion of
cumulative terror would therefore expand the definition of
imminence to include the concept of perpetual imminence in the
cases of battered women, but otherwise would still be faithful to the
traditional definition of self-defense.5'
The problem with such an expansion is that it allows too much
subjectivity, and permits almost any defendant to claim that she was in
constant fear of harm, especially in situations like prison, where
violence is commonplace. 3 Therefore, a defendant in a violent
environment would be able to take advantage of the violent nature of
that environment by arguing that his violent act was a response to
constant fear. That constant fear in turn creates an immediate threat
and justifies preemptive self-defense. This is an unintentional but
inevitable result of allowing this type of expansion.
One proponent of such an expansion of imminence recognizes
the possible problems with this proposal when she notes that "[s] ome
50 See Loraine Patricia Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to Be Killed, 32
HASTINGS LJ. 895, 928-29 (1981) (arguing that the threat in cases of battered women
killing their abusers is always imminent); see also CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATERED
WOMEN WHO KILL: PSCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGALJUSTIFICATION 59 (1987)
(criticizing current self-defense law and the insistence on retaining traditional
definitions of imminence in battered woman cases).
' Eber, supra note 50, at 929.
See id. at 927 (providing a hypothetical situation in which a woman is left by her
abusive husband, but he continues to threaten to kill her, and when she sees her
husband outside her apartment building she shoots and kills him). Eber states that
using the expanded definition of imminence, "an argument can be made that the facts
of the hypothetical fulfill the immediacy requirement of self-defense." Id. at 928-29.
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the environment of constant fear that a prisoner
who uses a preemptive strike could use to his advantage at trial).
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commentators have predicted that [such an analysis] will lead to
'open season on men.' 5 4  This assumption is rightfully rebutted,
though, by stating that "[t] hese women are only killing their husbands
because they realize that there is no other way to end the abuse.
Battered women are not likely to kill motivated by the assumption that
they will be able to get away with it."55 In other contexts-such as
prison-however, there are very possibly those who are likely to kill
motivated by the assumption that they will get away with it. This is the
danger of stating that one who is under constant fear of harm is under
an imminent threat-there are those who are not killing to escape a
dangerous situation, but will misappropriate this expanded definition
for less socially justified means.
3. A Procedural Proposal and Availability of Alternatives
Richard Rosen offers a third proposal, reacting to the Norman
cases in the North Carolina courts. He considers the various
responses to self-defense in battered woman syndrome cases and
suggests:
[T] he trial judge could instruct the jury that a killing in self-defense
must be in response to an imminent danger unless the defendant is able
to meet an initial burden of production by presenting substantial
evidence that the killing was necessary even though the danger was not
imminent. If, and only if, the defendant meets this burden of
production would imminence be eliminated as a sine qua non for self-
defense. Only then would the jury be instructed solely on necessity, with
the imminence of the threat constituting only one factor among many to
be considered.
6
Rosen also argues that, alongside considerations of imminence
and necessity, the jury must take into account the alternatives
available to a woman who chooses to commit a nonconfrontational
killing. 7 Essentially, Rosen proposes a burden-shifting procedure that
incorporates the previous proposals to eliminate imminence, but only
if a defendant meets a "substantial" evidentiary threshold regarding
necessity. After the burden-shifting procedure is complete, the issue
54 Eber, supra note 50, at 930.
5 Id. at 930-31.
56 Rosen, supra note 3, at 405-06.
57 See id. at 407 ("[I]n a case involving a nonconfrontational killing.., evidence
about whether she had a realistic chance to avoid death or serious physical abuse
without killing... and whether society had provided her with information about these
altematives, is indisputably relevant.").
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of availability of alternatives should then be addressed.
Rosen's proposal has the virtue of recognizing the dangers of
complete elimination of the imminence requirement, but fails to
recognize potential abuse of self-defense law."' One of the
assumptions inherent to Rosen's theory is that battered woman
syndrome cases are the only scenarios in which a defendant who uses
preemptive self-defense can claim that she had no reasonable
alternative:
In nonconfrontational situations outside of the battered woman
scenario, society usually provides other reasonably feasible alternatives to
homicidal self-help. Thus, even though the changes in self defense
law ... are not limited theoretically to cases in which women kill their
batterers, few defendants in generic self-defense cases could meet even a
minimal burden of production on a claim that self-defense was
warranted even though the danger threatened was not imminent. 9
As this Comment seeks to show, many inmates who wish to
misappropriate preemptive self-defense and attack other inmates will
be able to color a plausible claim, whether true or not, that they had
no reasonable alternative but to attack first.60 Therefore, Rosen's
assumption that battered woman syndrome cases have unique factual
qualities that preclude the use of preemptive self-defense in other
situations is somewhat shortsighted. Additionally, Rosen does not
specify the burden of production necessary to avoid an instruction
that includes imminence, stating only that it is "substantial."' Too
substantial a burden, however, would nullify the reason for the
proposed change, as it would prevent the "degree of individual
justice" that Rosen states he seeks in battered woman syndrome6,2
cases. Nevertheless, Rosen's proposal does not have as many pitfalls
as either eliminating the imminence requirement or changing the
definition of imminence.
The various proposals to modify self-defense in the context of
battered woman syndrome are problematic by themselves, but become
even more so when their prospective effects are considered. While
5 See id. at 391-92 (discussing possible results of eliminating the imminence
requirement).
59 Id. at 406.
See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the claim that prisoners have no other recourse
but to attack first).
61 See Rosen, supra note 3, at 405 (articulating jury instructions that embody the
modified imminence and necessity considerations).
(. Id. at 406.
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these proposals are motivated by a sense of justice, they fail to
recognize contexts other than battered woman syndrome in which any
new standard of self-defense could be misappropriated as a result of
less-than-legitimate motives. Prisons are one such environment where
this misappropriation is likely to occur.
III. PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN THE PRISON CONTEXT
A. The Role of Violence Within Prison Walls
Violence in prisons is described as "epidemic" and "ubiquitous."6'
The murder rate in prison has been calculated to be eight times
greater than that of the outside world, and the assault rate has been
estimated at approximately twenty times that outside prison. 4
Likewise, "[i]n United States' correctional institutions, instances of
sexual violence occur at a staggering rate." 5 One writer notes that
"[s]ome researchers estimate that of the forty-six million Americans
who will enter the criminal justice system at some point in their lives,
ten million will be raped while in custody."66
The effect of this culture of violence that has developed within
prison walls is an underground code that places a high value on self-. 67
preservation. Once within a prison, "retreating in the face of danger
is neither normative nor feasible; in prison your back is always against
the wall."6" Alongside the common scenario of two prisoners engaging
in mutual combat, however, there exists a separate, almost equally
common scenario: in order to protect himself from a vague
perception of future harm, one inmate attacks another without
provocation and claims self-defense. 69 These acts are often motivated
63 Anders Kaye, Comment, Dangerous Places: The Right to Self-Defense in Prison and
Prison Conditions Jurisprudence, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (1996).
64 Id. at 696.
65 Richard D. Vetstein, Note, Rape and ALDS in Prison: On a Collision Course to a New
Death Penalty, 30 SUFFoLKU. L. REv. 863, 863 (1997).
66 Id.
67 See infra text accompanying notes 75-76 (discussing the importance of status and
violence in prisons).
68 Robertson, supra note 1, at 339 (footnote omitted).
69 See id. at 340 (noting an inmate's suggestion that "the first time [a potential
aggressor] says something to you or looks wrong at you.... walk right up to him and
bash his face in and keep bashing him till he's down and out, and yell loud and clear
for all the other cons to hear you" (quoting PMI THOMAS, DowN THESE MEAN
STREETS, 256 (1967))); see also HANS TOCH, LIViNG IN PRISON 207-08 (American
Psychological Ass'n 1992) (1977) (discussing the use of violence as a preemptive
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by personal interest rather than genuine danger. One author
recounts a situation in which an inmate was counseled by a guard to
"[p]ick up the nearest thing around you and hit [another inmate] in
the head with it. He won't bother you no more."70  After this
statement the inmate states he will not be locked up for his actions" ,71
"[b] ecause I am using self-defense.
Although a certain level of violence within prisons is inevitable
barring radical reforms,72 society faces a line-drawing problem when
considering the role of self-defense in prison. For example, society
might be prepared to allow a prisoner to use force to defend himself
in the face of clear and present danger, but unwilling to accept the
situation described above as a legitimate, socially justified use of self-
defense.7' This issue complicates any proposals to reform substantive
self-defense law stemming from battered woman syndrome cases. Any
change in the imminence requirement to address battered woman
syndrome cases simply could be misappropriated by a prisoner as a
legal justification for a morally questionable action. Additionally, any
statute stating that the provisions of the new law would not apply to
prisoners would be vulnerable to colorable constitutional due process
challenges.74
response to threats, and noting that even prison guards sometimes advocate such
action to prisoners).
DANIEL LoCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE 55-56 (1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
71 Id.
7, See Kaye, supra note 63, at 695 (arguing that "nowhere is the need to defend
against violence more pressing than amidst the pervasive violence and sparse
protections of the modern American prison").
7- Such an assertion contains an implicit moral judgment similar to that made in
the battered woman syndrome context. See supra note 3 (discussing the probable
reaction to the use of preemptive violence by severely battered women). Certainly,
there are those who would disagree with the assertion that preemptive strikes in the
name of self-defense by prisoners provide little (if any) social Nalue when compared
with the plight of an abused woman. See generally Kaye, supra note 63, at 724-26
(arguing for a constitutional due process right to self-defense for prisoners). Such a
judgment, however, is appropriate when considering the implications of legally
condoned violence.
[T]he law itself can provide illuminating points of reference for moral
evaluation of illegal violence .... [T]he ordinary rules governing use of
physical force on behalf of oneself and others reflect a range of implicit moral
judgments concerning the kinds of rights or interests that warrant protection
by violent acts and the circumstances in which such acts are appropriate.
R. Kent Greenawalt, rWlence-LegalJustification and Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J. 437,
437 (1983).
74 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 63, at 718-24 (arguing in favor of a due process right to
self-defense for inmates). Jason Pepe has noted, however.
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While true self-defense is often necessary in prison, allowing
preemptive strikes through a lessened imminence requirement is
simply not a desirable result. The inevitable effect is that certain
prisoners will use violence to increase their stature among their peers
in an environment where violence equals respect. 75 To be accorded
status in prison, and "to be a 'standup guy'-requires one to embrace
intimidation and violence as operative principles of everyday life."76 If
an inmate is able to have a status-enhancing use of violence excused
by the courts, the atmosphere of the "walled battlefield" 77 will only
become more violent and lawless than it already is. Allowing
preemptive self-defense as a legitimate use of force within prisons will
serve to expand the culture of violence that currently exists among
inmates. The current formulation of the imminence requirement
should remain in place, preventing actions that would ultimately
78damage the spirit and intent of the law.
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether prisoners are a suspect class
[for Equal Protection purposes]. The lower federal courts, however, have
uniformly held that prisoners are a non-suspect group because status as a
prisoner is not an immutable characteristic; entry into the class is voluntary;
and entry into the class requires commission of an illegal act.
Jason E. Pepe, Challenging Congress's Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners' Constitutional
Rights, 23 HAMLINE L. REv. 59, 72 (1999) (footnote omitted); see Claire Oakes
Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to its Citizens, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (suggesting that "even when the right to self-defense
is conceived in its strongest form, it is not easily shown that the State is obliged to
respect conduct in its exercise").
7- See Robertson, supra note 1, at 343 ("The inmate subculture equates manliness
and status with displays of 'toughness' and aggression."); see also Kaye, supra note 63, at
696 (noting that violence "improves the self-image of the user" within the prison).
76 Robertson, supra note 1, at 345 & n.32 ("A 'standup guy' is an inmate who is at
the top of the prison caste system.... [T] his requires a willingness to use violence.").77
Id. at 341. Robertson uses this term to describe the subculture of violence and
seeming lawlessness that exists behind prison walls.
78 From a procedural standpoint, such a misappropriation of substantive self-
defense law would occur when criminal charges are brought against an inmate under
federal or state law. See id. ht 340 n.6 (noting the possibility of criminal charges).
Prisoners are also subject to discipline within the prison through various internal rules
governed by a given state's corrections department. See id. at 350-55 (describing
various internal prison policies regarding self-defense). For the purposes of
substantive law, the cases that are in the state or federal criminal system are more
significant, due to their precedential value, however prison disciplinary boards often
"apply the same standard used in the community" regarding substantive self-defense
law. Id. at 353 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting a letter from J.C. Kenney, Assistant
Director, Adult Institutions, Arizona Department of Corrections, to James E.
Robertson (Jan. 4, 1995)).
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B. The Prospective Effect on Prisons of Changes
to the Imminence Requirement
1. Elimination of the Imminence Requirement
The impact on prisons of eliminating the imminence requirement
in self-defense cases is clear. Were the requirement eliminated, the
unintentional effect would verge on official sanction of the predatory
culture of prisoners attacking first.
If a necessity standard replaced the imminence requirement,
prisoners who attack preemptively would be able to take advantage of
the very nature of the necessity justification to exculpate themselves.
The definition of necessity presupposes and labors to excuse a
preemptive act: "[t]he act charged must have been done to prevent a
significant evil."" Clearly, the first requirement of the necessity
defense is advantageous to a defendant who commits a preemptive
attack.
Likewise, the second requirement of necessity, that there must
have been "no adequate alternative,"" will be easy for an inmate
aggressor to meet, thus excusing his actions. Such an attacker will
argue that, in prison, backing down from even a verbal threat will
brand him as weak, placing him in future danger.8' Additionally,
prisoners will argue that protective custody in response to a threat is
not feasible, as "[m] ost targets will refuse offers of protective custody
because it ... accords them 'non-men' status."82 If a prisoner is able to
argue effectively that neither protective custody nor backing down to a
threat is a legitimate alternative to self-help, a sympathetic jury may
excuse a preemptive attack. This would set a dangerous precedent in
an environment that already thrives on violence, as it would give
prisoners yet another incentive to settle disputes through force.
A more difficult issue is the requirement of proportionality." An
attacker hoping to use this excuse would have to show that the harm
he caused was equal to or less than the harm threatened.84 The most
71, Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977,979 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added).
"" Id. at 979.
h, See Robertson, supra note 1, at 340 (quoting a prisoner on the importance of
fighting as saying, "[a]s far as the inmate is concerned, you have to prove yourself to
other inmates, as a man").
82 Id. at 344-45 (footnotes omitted).
"1 See Nelson, 597 P.2d at 979 (explaining that "the harm caused must not have
been disproportionate to the harm avoided").
See id. at 980 (finding disproportionality where the harm caused by self-defense
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likely way around this requirement for an inmate who wishes to use
necessity as a defense is to point to the generally high levels of
violence in prison, and state that a threatened violent or sexual attack
was virtually certain to occur.5 At the same time, the attacker could
point to past instances of violence to establish a baseline level of harm
816
that he was trying to avoid. Proportionality is difficult to prove or
disprove as there is usually little or no evidence available regarding
theoretical future harm. The defendant is naturally in the best
position to argue this point, as he can simply state what type of harm
he feared, and the prosecution will have to use circumstantial
evidence to disprove the defendant's state of mind. 7
2. Expansion of the Definition of Imminence
The proposal to expand the definition of imminence to include
situations involving a constant fear of harm is equally troublesome. 8
Given the high levels of violence within prisons, an inmate who
chooses to attack another inmate can simply argue that he was living
in a constant state of fear. Thus, a threat of harm is always imminent
under the proposed definition. 9 If the threat of harm is always
imminent, this proposal suggests that a preemptive strike could be
excused regardless of how far removed the defensive act is from the
actual threat. Because of the ubiquity of violence behind prison walls,
an inmate defendant's argument that he was under a state of constant
fear would certainly be plausible, notwithstanding the fact that an
was greater than the harm prevented).
5 Such an assertion will be effective particularly in jurisdictions that allow deadly
force to prevent sexual assault. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (addressing
the issue of proportionality between rape and homicide).
86 This approach would be limited, however, by issues of relevance. See, e.g., State
v. Wiggins, 808 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Kan. 1991) (upholding the trial court's determination
that testimony regarding a prior self-defense killing at the Kansas State Penitentiary
was irrelevant). This differs from battered woman syndrome cases in that a battered
woman will have only her previous experiences to point to, while a prisoner may be
able to point to instances of violence he has witnessed during his prison experience.
87 See id. at 1385 ("Deadly force is justified when the defendant subjectively
believes such force is necessary and is subject to an objective standard of
reasonableness.").
88 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing this proposal as a reaction to battered woman
syndrome cases).
89 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 1, at 342 (noting that "the victimization of
inmates by inmates is routine and expected and the corresponding fear of violence is
indeed great" (footnote omitted)). Again, this Comment concedes that there are
unquestionably high levels of violence within prisons, but seeks to address situations in
which a prisoner can use that fact to his advantage to exculpate himself.
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attacker may have used violence, not out of fear, but to improve his
status."
3. Procedural Analysis and Availability of Alternatives
The lack of alternatives to self-help in prison is also important
when considering Rosen's proposed modification to self-defense law,
which involves requiring a defendant to make a threshold showing
that the attack was necessary despite a lack of imminence. 9' A
preemptive attacker will simply be able to argue that he had no
reasonable alternative within the previously discussed prison
subculture other than to attack another inmate without warning.
Such a result, in a normative sense, is clearly undesirable because it
encourages violent self-help that is not motivated by any colorable
sense ofjustice."2
4. Case Law Addressing Preemptive Self-Defense in Prison
The substantive problems with expanding the definition of
imminence to include states of constant fear (and by implication,
eliminating the imminence requirement) are seen in some fairly
recent case law addressing self-defense in prison. In State v. Wiggins,
93
an inmate at the Kansas State Penitentiary claimed self-defense when
he stabbed another inmate whom he suspected of theft. 94 After
reporting the theft to penitentiary officials, the defendant, Wiggins,
was warned that "something would happen" both to him and to his
cellmate the following morning.9 ' As a result, Wiggins chose to use a
preemptive attack against the unarmed thief. At trial, Wiggins
testified that "he knew he must [either] kill [the thief] or be killed
himself." " Additionally, a psychologist offered expert testimony on
Wiggins's behalf regarding the "culture of fear" in prison, suggesting
See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between violence and stature in prisons).
"l Supra Part II.B.3. Rosen's failure to anticipate such uses of preemptive self-
defense is his theory's greatest weakness.
Ii Despite the lack of social value in preemptive strikes within prisons, there are
situations where legitimate self-defense appears necessary in prison. Simply because an
inmate should not be allowed to use a preemptive attack does not mean that the law
must require him to "submit to his own destruction." Kaye, supra note 63, at 722.
808 P.2d 1383 (Kan. 1991).
See id. at 1384-85 (providing the factual background of the case).
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1386.
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that Wiggins's actions were entirely reasonable given the
circumstances.9 '
Ultimately, Wiggins was convicted. If the jury had been
presented with a definition of imminence that included "constant
fear" of an attack, and thus excused a preemptive attack as an act of
self-defense, however, it is not difficult to see how the outcome could
have been different." Additionally, the defense's use of a respected
psychologist's expert testimony would likely make a defendant's
assertion that he was in constant fear more palatable and convincing
to a jury, leading to a higher number of acquittals for preemptive
attacks."
Such an expansion of the definition of imminence could have
affected the outcome in United States v. Holt.'1° In Holt, a prisoner
convicted of inmate weapons possession claimed that he had procured
the weapon in question for purposes of self-defense. 0' The court
concluded that:
Holt has failed to produce any evidence that he was under imminent
threat of death or bodily injury when he possessed the knife.... Holt
testified that he picked up the knife as his attackers fled the scene, and
that he continued possessing the knife only because he was afraid they
would return.... [H]owever, Holt's generalized fear of a repeat attack
cannot qualify as an imminent threat of death or injury.102
If the proposal to expand imminence to include continuous fear
were accepted, Holt's generalized fear of a repeat attack would qualify
as an imminent threat by definition.
Hence, Wiggins and Holt demonstrate the danger of expanding
the definition of imminence. Inmates who live in an environment full
97 Id. Although a self-defense instruction regarding reasonableness was the central
issue considered by the Kansas Supreme Court in this case, issues of imminence and
reasonableness are closely related. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text
(describing the relationship between reasonableness and imminence).
98 The jury was instructed, inter alia, that "[a] person is justified in the use of
force against an aggressor when and to the extent.., that such conduct is necessary to
defend himself... against such aggressor's imminent use of unlawful force.'" Wiggins,
808 P.2d at 1385 (quotingjury instructions).
See id. at 1386 (noting the expert testimony of Dr. Glen Lipson, a psychologist
from the Menninger Foundation, who testified as to the value placed on violence in
prisons).
100 79 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 1996).
i01 The court also discusses the propriety of raising a common law affirmative
defense to a strict liability offense such as that at bar in this case. See id. at 16
(concluding that some courts have allowed the defense under certain circumstances).
102 Id.
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of violence will be able to state that they harbor a constant,
generalized fear of attack. This fear, whether or not it attaches to a
specific person, could qualify as an imminent threat of death or
injury. In fact, the fear would not even need to be individualized
towards specific aggressors, as is necessary with battered woman
syndrome cases.1 In turn, this widening of the imminence
requirement will qualify prisoners to claim self-defense when they
preemptively attack another inmate or procure illegal weapons to
ostensibly protect themselves. Proponents of changing the current
substantive law of self-defense should realize that inmates may exploit
the violent nature of prisons to their advantage, and that any possible
change would, in the current substantive law of self-defense, have
effects far beyond its intended purpose. The proponents' intention
would be abused by the availability of the defense to those who have a
fear of a specific aggressor, as is the case with a battered woman.
IV. THE CULTURAL DEFENSE AND THE PossrILTY
OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
Prison, however, is not the only context where a change in the
imminence requirement could be misappropriated by an
opportunistic defendant wishing to strike first. One of the more
controversial recent developments in the arena of legal theory is the
creation of the cultural defense. 14 Proponents of the cultural defense
argue that "jiuries... decide whether cultural factors were
determinative in a defendant's behavior, and, if so, whether that is
sufficient to warrant either a lesser charge or complete acquittal."'5
Cultural factors, according to certain commentators, are so behavior-
determinative that "evidence of culture [should be] introduced as
Generally, the self-defending inmate would be in fear of his ultimate attacker.
See, eg., iggins, 808 P.2d at 1384-85 (noting that a particular inmate's fear of attack
from another inmate arose out of a specific previous confrontation). However, it is
conceivable that no previous confrontation is necessary in order to claim fearfulness,
based on the very nature of prison itself. If violence is ubiquitous in prisons, it is likely
that any given inmate has been involved in a violent confrontation at some point. An
inmate, whether involved in the previous incident or not, could point to the other
inmate's acts and reputation as legitimate sources of fear. See Kaye, supra note 63, at
696 (noting that the available evidence supports the idea of prison as a place where
violence is ubiquitous); Robertson, supra note 1, at 343-45 (noting that an inmate's
reputation of propensity for violence translates into status within the prison
population).
See supra note 2 (discussing the theoretical bases of the cultural defense).
:' Renteln, supra note 2, at 440.
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relevant to show a lack of the requisite elements of the crime charged
or to show a requisite element of a traditional defense, such as
provocation or self-defense.' 0' The cultural defense has proved
successful in a handful of notorious cases through either acquittal or
lessened charges.0 7
The reaction to the cultural defense is quite divided in the legal
community.' 8 Although self-defense has not been an issue at the
forefront of the debate over the cultural defense, the cultural defense
has been used in conjunction with self-defense on certain occasions,
with varying levels of success.'08 Just because the cultural defense has
not been widely used in connection with preemptive self-defense does
not mean, however, that the possibility of future use is negligible. As
has been shown in certain celebrated cases, attorneys can simply
extend standard doctrine to fit even the most seemingly absurd legal
theories."' Given the typical defendant's instinct of self-preservation,
it is not difficult to see that the cultural defense could be the next
logical exploitation of any change in substantive self-defense law.
In cases where culture has been used as a part of a self-defense
claim, reasonableness, rather than imminence, is typically the central
issue."' In one case, People v. Croy,"2 a Native American defendant's
106 Deborah M. Boulette Taylor, Paying Attention to the Little Man Behind the Curtain:
Destroying the Myth of the Liberal's Dilemma, 50 ME. L. REV. 446, 458 (1998).
See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, IndividualizingJustice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (describing some of these
cases). Coleman describes the cultural defense as successful in the case of ajapanese-
American woman drowning her two children and subsequently claiming that she was
engaging in the "time-honored, customary practice of parent-child suicide." Id. Also
described is a case in which a Chinese-American man was acquitted of murder charges
after he killed his wife for being unfaithful, claiming that his "conduct comports with a
Chinese custom that allows husbands to dispel their shame in this way when their wives
have been unfaithful." Id.
108 Compare id. at 1166-67 (concluding that the cultural defense is undesirable
because it would lead to "cultural codes" in which legal responsibility is based upon
national origin), with Taylor, supra note 106, at 470 (concluding that the cultural
defense is consistent with the current state of the law).
109 See Renteln, supra note 2, at 453-56 (discussing both successful and unsuccessful
uses of the cultural defense).
110 Some of the more notorious examples of this phenomenon include the
"Twinke defense" raised by Don White in the murders of San Francisco Mayor George
Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk, and the abused child defense raised by the
Menendez brothers. See Morse, supra note 24, at 4 (arguing that these seemingly novel
defenses are merely extensions of well settled legal doctrine).
III See Renteln, supra note 2, at 455 ("Any attempt to introduce cultural
considerations via self-defense will require a 'subjective' interpretation of the
reasonable person.").
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conviction for murdering a police officer was overturned after he
argued that Native Americans were victims of discrimination and that
they had been conditioned to distrust white authorities."
3
Accordingly, Croy argued that "he was predisposed to perceive that his
life was in jeopardy." 4 Croy prevailed on the theory that his actions
were reasonable where he felt there was no opportunity for him to
surrender to the officer."1
Yet, imminence has been at issue in certain cases involving the
cultural defense. In Ha v. State, a Vietnamese immigrant argued that
cultural considerations should lead to an instruction on self-defense,
despite the lack of imminence."9 The facts of this case are not unlike
a typical prison self-defense scenario. Ha got into a heated argument
with another Vietnamese man who was working on the same ship.
The man threatened Ha, which led to an altercation between the two
men. The next day, Ha shot the fellow employee in the back, killing
him. 17 During trial, in response to the judge's questions on the issue
of imminence, Ha's lawyer responded that "I think 'imminency' [is
viewed through] the eyes of the person asserting justifiable force....
[The issue is] whether in [the] defendant's mind he felt that he was in
imminent danger.""" As ajustification for this broad interpretation of
imminence, Ha's lawyer argued that "[y] ou'd have to [ask] how would
another Vietnamese, knowing how Vietnamese behave, knowing how,
when Vietnamese make a public threat, that they carry it out and that
you should take those threats seriously.""" In essence, Ha was arguing
for a cultural interpretation of the imminence requirement.
Ultimately, Ha was denied an instruction on self-defense, but the
ramifications of an expanded definition of imminence (or an
elimination of imminence) were made clear by this case. A primary
obstacle to Ha obtaining a self-defense instruction was the imminence
requirement, and the traditional definitions and legal notions that
requirement carries. Were the imminence requirement to be given
an expanded definition, or eliminated altogether (as suggested by
IN 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985).
"13 See Renteln, supra note 2, at 454-55 (describing Croy's arguments on appeal
and describing Croy's defense as a "culturally relative reasonable person test").
114 Id. at 454.
W1 Id.
"t, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
117 Id. at 186-87.
11 Id. at 188-89 (alterations in original).
10 Id. at 189 (second alteration in original).
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some commentators reacting to battered woman syndrome cases),
similar preemptive strikes in the name of self-defense would become
more commonplace and more likely to be excused by a jury. The
prospective change in the imminence requirement would contribute
to a legal atmosphere in which a defendant could scour his personal
and cultural background for information that he could use in the
courtroom, and the prospects of a jurisprudence that places value on
acceptance of responsibility would be significantly dimmer. Ha's
actions appear to be vigilantism rather than justice-whereas many
would argue that justice is being served in the battered woman
scenario-but Ha's actions run the risk of being legally sanctioned if
the imminence requirement is changed to accommodate justice in the
battered woman syndrome context.
Of particular interest is the fact that the imminence requirement
for preemptive strikes by battered women was discussed by both the
judge and defense counsel in the Ha case. 2 ' Defense counsel argued
that "[t]he fact that [the victim] was shot from behind is irrelevant,
just like the fact that a husband is shot while he's asleep."'2' While
denying a self-defense instruction on the basis of imminence, the
judge addressed the issue of preemptive strikes by battered spouses,
stating that:
Although in such instances there is commonly ample evidence to
support a finding that the killing was motivated by fear and that the fear
was as real and as urgent at the time of the killing as it was when the
husband was awake and actually capable of immediate physical abuse,
cases have uniformly refused to apply self-defense to this category of
crime. The basis of the refusal has been lack of an immediate threat of
harm.
22
The significance of the judge's statement that "[t]he basis of
refusal has been the lack of an immediate threat" lies in the
recognition that a narrow imminence requirement is a barrier to a
self-defense instruction for battered women.lu In the same vein, that
narrow definition of imminence is the most significant barrier for an
instruction in Ha's case. If, for example, the proposal to expand the
definition of imminence to allow for constant fear was accepted in
battered woman syndrome cases, Ha would be able to argue that due
120 Id. at 189-92.
121 Id. at 189 (first alteration in original).
122 Id. at 191-92 (quoting Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 778 n.8 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982)).
123 Id. at 192.
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to his Vietnamese culture, he was in constant fear of the man he killed
and was therefore justified in killing him. 4  Surely, this is not a
desirable result, nor is it the intended result of commentators who
argue that the imminence requirement should be modified in
battered woman syndrome cases.125
Some obvious differences arise when the cultural defense is
compared with battered woman cases and prison self-defense cases,
most importantly, the availability of alternatives."' From a theoretical
standpoint, a case such as Ha's is quite different from one in which a
defendant's back is truly against the wall. One who wished to use the
cultural defense in such a manner, however, would be able to argue
that "[he or she] was compelled to act the way he or she did" due to
his or her culture. 7  In such a case, proponents of the cultural
defense argue, the individual's volition is psychologically dictated by
her culture'2 to the same extent that fear dictates the behavior of a
battered woman or prisoner. As was previously addressed, the
prospective effects of changing the substantive law are not limited to
the area of battered women's cases, and an alternative is necessary.
124 See supra Part I1.B.2 (describing the proposal to expand the definition of
imminence to allow a particular defendant to argue that her constant fear based upon
past experiences produces a perpetually imminent threat).
123 One of the more difficult issues inherent in the cultural defense is the tension
between respect for immigrant cultures and American notions of civil rights, especially
as those rights apply to women. Doriane Coleman summarizes the cultural defense
argument as mandating that, "in the name of cultural pluralism, a part of the law
should take two steps back in this area of women's rights." Coleman, supra note 107, at
1142. Coleman also argues that "acceptance of these cultural norms forces
immigrants, and most often immigrant women, to go back to a time when American
law formally discriminated against women and people of color, a time to which most
would agree we as a society do not want to return." Id.
12, Compare supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (noting that battered women
often do not believe that they can leave the abusive situation), with supra notes 74-76
and accompanying text (discussing the fact that a high value is placed on violence in
prison, and that violence is important in gaining status).
127 Renteln, supra note 2, at 439.
r2t See id. (noting a lack of volition on the part of an individual whose behavior has
been influenced largely by his culture).
12 See supra text accompanying notes 32, 48 (discussing the application of a
change in the substantive law to areas outside of the limited realm of battered women's
cases). For examples of cases that illustrate the point that preemptive self-defense
might have been allowed if the substantive law were changed as proposed, see People v.
Minifie, 920 P.2d 1337, 1343-46 (Cal. 1996) (involving a preemptive attack based on
vague threats and fear of future harm), and State v. Buggs, 806 P.2d 1381, 1383-84
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (involving a claim by a defendant that he shot a Grip gang
member in preemptive self-defense based upon his fear of future gang violence).
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF
SELF-DEFENSE: EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
As changing the substantive law of self-defense will have negative,
albeit unintentional, effects outside of the realm of battered women's
cases, a different means to achieve the ends of justice is necessary.
Advocating clemency in certain battered women's cases again
presupposes some sort of moral justification for the act being excused.
As has been noted, "[w]hile there is no unanimous agreement that
battered women who kill are, or should be, legally justified in their
actions, one must admit that such women are in a different position
with relation to justice than are other classes of homicide
defendants."'" Instead of changing substantive law in an attempt to
achieve more acquittals at the trial level, advocates for battered
women should consider alternative approaches, such as encouraging
states to install a comprehensive system of clemency review to screen
cases where battered women have been convicted of killing their
abusers. Such an approach would ensure that ajust result is reached,
and would avoid the negative effects of changing the substantive
definition of self-defense.
A majority of state constitutions vest the power of clemency
exclusively in the state's executive.13' The concept of clemency
encompasses various postconviction acts of relief:
A "pardon" is an executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment
for a crime; it is used most often to restore the reputation and civil rights
of someone who has led an exemplary life subsequent to punishment.
"Amnesty," which usually is granted to a group of people, in essence
"overlooks" an offense because the conduct served to benefit the public
good. "Commutation" substitutes a milder punishment for the one
imposed; it does not remove the legal or moral guilt of the offender.
132
In the context of clemency for battered women, commutation and
pardons are the most common forms of postconviction relief.
Various theories for the granting of clemency have been put forth.
First, clemency can provide relief in cases of "factual/legal innocence
or substantial doubt of guilt."133 In such cases, the accused woman
either did not commit the actus reus, or was legally justified in
ISO Christine Noelle Becker, Note, Clemency for Killers? Pardoning Battered Women
Who Strike Back, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 297, 312 (1995) (citation omitted).
131 Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of
Battered Women Who Kill; 46 FLA. L. REV. 699, 706 (1994).
132 Id. (citations omitted).
133 Becker, supra note 130, at 325.
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committing the crime. Second, clemency may be available in cases
involving "technical guilt with significant mitigating factors."'3 This
situation arises "when the defendant suffered from some sort of
reduced ability at the time of the crime."' 3 Third, clemency can be
used to address "technical guilt with moral innocence."" ' Under a
retributivist theory of justice, the woman who kills her battering
spouse is free of moral guilt, and society would not benefit from
seeking to punish her.'" A final ground for clemency involves
"disparities in punishment and sentencing unrelated to deserts."'1
This encompasses both "sentencing disparities among those convicted
of the same crime within the same jurisdiction," and "sentencing that
is unrelated to just deserts."'4 "
The use of the clemency power in battered woman syndrome
cases, although currently not particularly widespread, is not
necessarily novel. For example, in 1990, Ohio Governor Richard
Celeste commuted the sentences of twenty-five women convicted of
killing their abusive husbands.4 In this situation, the Ohio Adult
Parole Board Authority ("APA") brought nineteen of well over one
hundred case applications for clemency to the attention of the
Governor, who then initiated proceedings himself for seven of those'42
women."2 The women were able to present evidence on their own
behalf during the reviews, and the Governor considered "medical
records, prior convictions, the APA recommendations, and the
inmates' prison records." As a requirement for clemency, the
governor required each of those who were to be released to have
served at least two years in prison, and to perform an additional two
hundred hours of community service.'" In 1991, Maryland Governor
William Donald Schaefer also pardoned eight women who had been
'.' Id.
I d. at 328.
". Id.
, 7 Id. at 329.
138 See id. at 330 (noting also that "[o]ne additional situation where technical guilt
with moral innocence is present is when the offender has already suffered enough to
atone for their crime").
19 Id.
1, Id.
41 Krause, supra note 131, at 703.
42 See id. at 720-21 (describing Ohio's mechanism for initiating clemency
proceedings).
'4- Id. at 722.
144 Id. at 723.
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convicted, after meeting individually with these abused women.145
Finally, the defendant in the seminal case of Norman I1 was granted a
commuted sentence two months after she entered prison.1
46
In order for clemency to be an effective alternative to legislative
revision of self-defense, a coherent and predictable system of case
review would be necessary. 47 Often, cases of battered women who
were convicted of killing their abusers are brought to the attention of
a state governor by advocacy groups. In other situations, a governor
will simply ask his aides to review the files of all convicted battered
women to search for cases in which clemency might be appropriate. 
4
Such an approach, however, is criticized as lacking focus and being
overinclusive.'50
One organized approach to reviewing battered women's cases was
initiated in Texas, where the state parole board was encouraged to
review "the cases of all persons who pled to or were convicted of
murder or manslaughter when the offense was directly related to
victimization by domestic violence." 5 ' This more formal type of
review that involves a state agency, rather than simply being initiated
by advocacy groups or the governor, has the advantages of
thoroughness and familiarity, as employees of a particular state parole
board are better trained to screen cases that would be appropriate for
clemency review.'52 Under such a system, clemency need not be
145 Id. at 727-28.
146 DREssLER, supra note 43, at 445 (discussing Norman 1, 378 S.E.2d at 8); see also
supra note 3 (presuming most lay citizens would agree thatJudy Norman's conviction
should have been overturned).
147 Such a formal system is necessary in part because of the "tendency among
legislators to assume that once ... a statute is enacted into law, the problem of
battered women who kill their abusers has been fully addressed. Legislators often
assume that once expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is statutorily allowed
at trial, deserving victims will be acquitted." Becker, supra note 130, at 314 (citation
omitted).
148 See, e.g., Krause, supra note 131, at 766 (noting that the commutations in
Maryland were initiated through the work of advocacy groups).
149 See, e.g., id. (noting this approach in Ohio).
50 See id. at 765 (harboring these criticisms and asking, "[d]oes the governor
review the case of every woman who could have presented evidence of abuse at trial?
Does the governor review only those cases involving women who attempted to present
the evidence but were not allowed to do so... [or] only the cases of those women
whose files contain allegations of abuse?").
1 Alison M. Madden, Note, Clemency for Battered Women Mho Kill Their Abusers:
Finding ajust Forum, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 79 (1993) (quotation marks omitted).
15 See Krause, supra note 131, at 766-68 (discussing the qualifications of those who
would review cases).
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limited to battered women's cases.
The granting of clemency to women who are convicted of killing
their abusive husbands is not without its critics. The widespread use
of clemency initiates serious separation of powers concerns, as an
executive solution would essentially obviate the judiciary's traditional
role in shaping the law of the land.'5 Additionally, since the power of
clemency is vested in the executive, it could become more of a
political than legal tool. 154  Likewise, there is a concern that if
clemency becomes too common, battered woman syndrome will
become an excuse at trial that can be used falsely to a defendant's
advantage.' Additionally, there exists the possibility that battered
woman syndrome would not be raised until after the trial, as a last-
ditch effort by a convicted defendant to clear her name using a tool
designed to promote justice. While "[i] t is possible in battering cases,
just as in every other criminal case, that the accused may lie or
exaggerate her position," a clemency reviewer would be in a strong
position from an eidentiary standpoint to discern between legitimate
and illegitimate claims.'56
However, such a system will serve the interests of the law better
than a modification of substantive self-defense law. Any negative
effects will be limited to the context that the system is created to
address, whereas a change in self-defense law would apply to all cases,
not just those involving battered women. 7  Clemency is preferable
because it takes away the temptation for judges and legislators to
modify the law to achieve a quick fix in a handful of cases. Instead,
the better approach is to review cases after they have gone through
the system to prevent unforeseen misappropriations of new common
law precedent and statutory solutions. A system of clemency would
also be preferable because, "[w]hile courts are limited in considering
some types of evidence, a governor is not bound by these rules." 58
Overly formalistic rules of evidence may exclude many relevant facts at
" See id. at 724 (discussing concerns among prosecutors that clemency infringes a
jury's authority).
I 4 See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a
Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. &
POL'Y 1, 48-51 (1994) (giving examples of "partisan pardons").
M. See id. at 57 (noting the concern that a battered woman syndrome defense
might be fabricated).
1 Id. at 58.
17 See supra Parts III, IV (discussing the application of precedent in other
situations).
11 Ammons, supra note 154, at 76.
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trial, facts that a clemency reviewer would be able to consider in
reaching a fully informed decision. Likewise, "[a] governor's
definition of justice can be broader than just what the law requires
and under such circumstance she could use her power of clemency to
reflect a justice as fairness stance."159 Finally, unlike common law
interpretations of self-defense, which vary from state to state, "[t]he
law on clemency is settled. Regardless of the reasons an executive may
have for granting clemency, the scrutiny of this discretionary act will
be left to the political process rather than to the courts."'6u It is for
these reasons of limited reach and the potential for more fact specific
inquiries that a post-conviction system of relief through clemency is
preferable to ill-conceived alterations in self-defense law. While not a
perfect or exclusive solution, it is a more acceptable means to achieve
justice in battered women's cases than modifying the pre-existing law
of self-defense.
CONCLUSION
Violence is never a desirable result to a conflict. The law of self-
defense recognizes, however, that violence is sometimes necessary and
justified to defend oneself from an imminent attack. In cases
involving battered women, the substantive law often precludes a jury
instruction on self-defense because the act of self-defense was so far
removed from any imminent harm that the act does not fit the
definition that the law provides. While some would argue that
battered women are morally justified in using a preemptive strike as a
means of self-defense, those who believe that a change in the law is
necessary to protect battered women do not recognize the prospective
effects of such a change. A relaxed imminence requirement could be
misappropriated by prisoners, and through the cultural defense, used
to allow preemptive self-defense in cases in which society is less
prepared to accept it as a legitimate use of self-help. As a result,
proponents of changing self-defense law as a reaction to battered
women's cases should instead focus their efforts on encouraging a
formal clemency review system to achieve their goals without negative
prospective effects.
159 Id. at 74.
160 Id. at 29.
